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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order granting Summary Judgment requiring the repayment of 
commissions as the measure of damages for the violation of Policy 20 in the Melaleuca 
Independent Marketing Executive Agreement. The commissions were paid to Rick and Natalie 
Foeller for a period before the termination of their relationship with Melaleuca, but after the 
Foellers are alleged to have violated Policy 20 in the agreement providing for the "forfeiture by 
the Marketing Executive of all commissions or bonuses payable for and after the calendar month 
in which the violation occurred." The order also denied the Foellers' Motion for Summary 
Judgment that the application of Policy 20 constitutes an unlawful forfeiture or penalty that is 
designed solely to deter a breach or punish the breaching party. 
ll. The Course of the District Court Proceedings and Disposition 
1. On April 29, 2009 Melaleuca filed its Complaint and jury demand against the 
Foellers alleging breach of contract, intentional interference with economic advantage, and 
tortious interference with a contract. 
2. On July 9, 2010, Melaleuca filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
3. On December 1, 2010, the Court denied Melaleuca's Motion for Summary 
Judgment with the following reasoning: 
Melaleuca states that the [$23,856.41] amount requested is reasonable because it 
exactly matches the damages Melaleuca suffered as a result of paying 
commissions to the Foellers. This argument is unconvincing based on the 
evidence currently before this court. Melaleuca seeks to retroactively take money 
paid to the Foellers for sales commissions; there is no argument or evidence that 
these commissions were not tied to profitable sales as a result of the Foellers' 
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work as contractors for Meleleuca or that these are recognizable damages. 
Rather, it appears that, lacking other evidence, Policy 20(c) acts solely to "deter a 
breach or to punish the breaching party." 
Opinion, Decision, and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Summmy Judgment, 
entered December 1, 2010, Clerk's Record on Appeal, page 64-65 
4. Following completion of discovery, on October 19, 2011, Melaleuca filed a 
Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's decision denying Melaleuca's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
5. On October 20, 2011, the Foellers filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
6. On November 9, 2011 the Foellers filed motions to strike various affidavits filed 
in support of Melaleuca' s Motion for Reconsideration. 
7. The various motions were heard by the District Court on November 21, 2011. 
8. On December 21, 2011 the District Court issued its Opinion and Order on 
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration granting Melaleuca's Motion for Reconsideration, 
entering summary judgment in favor of Melaleuca in the amount of $23,856.41, and denying the 
Foellers' Motion for Summary Judgment. The court also denied the Foellers' Motions to Strike 
on the basis that it had not relied upon the affidavits for its decision. The reasoning for the 
court's opinion was: 
Without considering the argument now made by Melaleuca that commissions 
paid to marketing executives generally are not tied to any specific sales 
activity undertaken by them, the Court is now persuaded that Policy 20(c)(i) 
simply excuses Melaleuca from performing under a contract that has been 
breached by the other party. As cited by Melaleuca, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has clearly held that "[i]f a breach of contract is material, the other 
party's performance is excused." JP. Stravens Planning Associates, Inc. v. 
City of Wallace, 129 Idaho 542, 545, 928 P.2d 46, 49 (Ct.App 1996) (citing 
Ervin Constr. Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 700, 874 P.2d 506, 511 
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(1993)). "A substantial or material breach of contract is one which touches 
the fundamental purpose of the contract and defeats the object of the parties in 
entering into the contract." JP Stravens, 129 Idaho at 545, 928 P.2d at 49 
(quoting Ervin Const. Co., 125 Idaho at 700, 874 P.2d at 511. 
Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, entered 
December 21, 2011, Clerk's Record on Appeal, page 593. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the district court erred by granting monetary damages based upon the 
defense of material breach of contract. 
2. Whether the district court erred by failing to determine that the application of 
Policy 20 constitutes an unlawful penalty or forfeiture in the absence of evidence that Melaleuca 
suffered any actual damages and the amount of any such damages. 
3. Whether the Foellers are entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 12-120(3). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Rick and Natalie Foeller entered into the agreement with Melaleuca, Inc. in September 
1999. Pursuant to the agreement, the Foellers received commissions and prizes for selling 
Melaleuca's products and for enrolling other independent marketing executives with Melaleuca. 
The Foellers received monthly commission checks from Melaleuca for commissions and bonuses 
until September, 2008. The Foellers resigned as Melaleuca marketing executives on November 
13, 2008. 
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Melaleuca withheld the Foellers' outstanding October, 2008 commissions in the amount 
of $7,968.00. On December 5, 2008, Melaleuca, through its Associate General Counsel, Justin 
Powell, sent the Foellers a letter, which stated as follows: 
Due to recent reports that you have recruited and attempted to recruit Melaleuca 
Customers and Marketing Executives to another business in violation of Policy 
20, to which you are still bound. Melaleuca has the right to impose fines and 
recover damages, including by withholding from outstanding commissions and 
bonuses, to help offset the harm to Melaleuca and to other independent Melaleuca 
businesses." 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex.C, Clerk's 
Record on Appeal, page 57 
On April 29, 2009, Melaleuca filed this action in Bonneville County against the Foellers 
alleging that the Foellers committed tortious acts against Melaleuca which interfered with 
Melaleuca's agreement with other Independent Marketing Executives and/or Customers. The 
Complaint also alleges that the Foellers violated Policy 20 of Melaeuca's Statement of Policies in 
the IMEA Agreement by recruiting other Melaleuca Independent Marketing Executives into 
another network marketing company named Max International ("Max"). 
The Complaint seeks damages, but it does not state any specific damages caused by the 
Foellers, nor does the Complaint specify a dollar value of alleged damages. See Ex.A, 
Armstrong Affidavit. Rather, the Complaint generally alleges that "[t]he actions of Defendants 
have caused, and will continue to entitled to recover from Defendants all past and future costs, 
damages, and losses incurred as a result of the improper actions of Defendants, in an amount to 
be proven at the time of trial or at the time judgment is requested." Id. at para. 9. 
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Melaleuca testified it would be difficult to measure and state the amount of its damages, 
and that therefore it was going to engage a "special consultant" to help or assist Melaleuca in 
calculating its damages. See Exhibit C of Armstrong Affidavit, page 110, lines 19 through 23. 
As of the cut-off date for all fact and expert discovery, Melaleuca had not disclosed the amount 
of its damages, nor provided any evidence of damages except to state the amount of commissions 
paid. See Affidavit of Richard J. Armstrong, Clerk's Record on Appeal, page 333. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the standard of review is the 
same as the standard used by the district court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Am. 
Falls Reservoir Distr. No. 2 v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862, 869, 154 P. 3d 
433, 440 (2007); State v. Rubbermaid Incorporated, 129 Idaho 353, 355-356, 924 P.2d 615, 617-
618 (1996); Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 529, 887 P.2d 1034, 1036 
(1994). Upon review, the Court must liberally construe facts in the existing record in favor of 
the nonmoving party, and draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the 
nonmoving party, Id.; Am. Falls Reservoir Dis tr. No. 2 v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 143 
Idaho 862, 869, 154 P. 3d 433, 440 (2007). Summary Judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter oflaw." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991). If there are 
conflicting inferences contained in the record or reasonable minds reach different conclusions, 
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summary judgment must be denied. Am. Falls Reservoir Distr. No. 2 v. Idaho Dept. of Water 
Resources, 143 Idaho 862, 869, 154 P. 3d 433, 440 (2007). 
ARGUMENT 
I. The district court erred by granting monetary damages based upon the 
defense of material breach of contract. 
In its Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, the district court 
granted Summary Judgment in favor of Melaleuca in the amount of $23,856.41 CDN based upon 
its conclusion that "[i]n this particular case, Melaleuca was unaware of the breach until after they 
had already paid the Foellers $23,856.41 CDN in commissions and therefore are entitled to, as 
damages, repayment of that exact amount." 
The court did not require any evidence showing that the amount of commissions paid 
bore any relation to actual damages suffered by Melaleuca. Melaleuca never provided any such 
evidence. Instead the court reasoned that "[t]he actions of the Foellers clearly breached the 
IMEA and that breach was material. Consequently, "Melaleuca's performance, specifically that 
of the payment of commissions to the Foellers, was excused." 
The district court's decision is based upon JP. Stravens Planning Associates, Inc. v. City 
of Wallace, 129 Idaho 542, 928 P.2d 46 (Ct. App. 1996) The District Court held: 
Without considering the argument now made by Melaleuca that commissions paid 
to marketing executives generally are not tied to any specific sales activity 
undertaken by them, the Court is now persuaded that Policy 20( c)(i) simply 
excuses Melaleuca from performing under a contract that has been breached by 
the other party. As cited by Melaleuca, the Idaho Court of Appeals has clearly 
held that "[i]f a breach of contract is material, the other party's performance is 
excused." JP. Stravens Planning Associates, Inc. v. City of Wallace, 129 Idaho 
542, 545, 928 P.2d 46, 49 (Ct.App 1996) (citing Ervin Constr. Co. v. Van Orden, 
125 Idaho 695, 700, 874 P.2d 506, 511 (1993)). "A substantial or material breach 
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of contract is one which touches the fundamental purpose of the contract and 
defeats the object of the parties in entering into the contract." JP Stravens, 129 
Idaho at 545, 928 P.2d at 49 (quoting Ervin Const. Co., 125 Idaho at 700, 874 
P.2d at 511. 
Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Motion/or Reconsideration, Clerk's Record on Appeal, 
p. 593. 
The problem with the court's application of JP. Stravens as a means of establishing the 
existence and the amount of damages is that JP. Stravens and similar cases only provide for a 
defense excusing performance. In JP. Stravens, "[t]he city did not seek an affirmative recovery 
against Stravens; it sought only a judgment relieving the city of any obligation to pay Stravens' 
claimed fees. Therefore, the city had no need to prove damages." J.P. Stravens, 129 Idaho at 
545, 928 P.2d at 49. (Emphasis added.) Further, the court explained in a footnote: "Curiously, 
and inappropriately, the city pleaded its breach of warranty defense as a 'counterclaim,' even 
though the city did not allege entitlement to recover any damages from Stravens. "Id. at FNI. 
The materiality of a breach is not relevant when determining whether a plaintiff is 
entitled to monetary damages or the amount of any such damages. The question of materiality 
only arises when the Plaintiff pursues a remedy other than monetary damages, such as the 
rescission of the contract, or when a Defendant raises a Plaintiff's breach of contract as a defense 
to enforcement of the contract. See J.P. Stravens; Mountain Restaurant Corp. v. Parkcenter 
Mall Associates, 122 Idaho 261, 833 P.2d 119 (Ct.App. 1992); State c. Chacon, 198 P.3d 749 
(Idaho Ct.App. 2008); Blaser v. Cameron, 829 P .2d 1361 (Idaho Ct.App. 1992). The Plaintiff's 
burden to provide its damages is not ameliorated by the materiality of the breach. 
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A plaintiff must prove the fact that it has been damaged as well as the amount of 
damages. Furthermore, both must be proven to a reasonable certainty. Powell v. Sellers, 130 
Idaho 122, 127, 937 P.2d 434, 439 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912, 919, 
684 P.2d 314, 321 (Ct. APP. 1984); Eliopulos v. Kondo Farms, Inc., 102 Idaho 915, 919, 643 
P.2d 1085, 1089 (Ct. App. 1982) ("Damages, and the amount thereof, must be proven to a 
reasonable certainty.") (Emphasis added). Thus, "the measure of damage - as well as the fact of 
damage - must be proven beyond speculation." Wing, 106 Idaho at 919, citing Eliopulos, 102 
Idaho 915. 
When a plaintiff claims lost profits as damages, the foregoing still applies. 
"Compensatory damages for lost profits and future earnings must be shown with a reasonable 
certainty." Todd v. Sullivan Const., LLC, 146 Idaho 118, 122, 191 P.3d 196, 200 (Idaho 2008) 
(emphasis added), quoting Inland Group o_f Companies, Inc. v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 
133 Idaho 249, 257, 985 P.2d 674, 682 (Idaho 1999). "Reasonable certainty requires neither 
absolute assurance nor mathematical exactitude; rather, the evidence need only be sufficient to 
remove the existence of damages from the realm of speculation." Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout 
Co., Inc., 143 Idaho 733, 740, 152 P.3d 604, 611 (2007). And "reasonable certainty requires 
more than a mere estimate of net profit as a percentage of gross income. There must generally 
be supporting evidence of overhead expenses or other costs of producing income." B & F Inc. v. 
Intermountain Gas Co., 99 Idaho 730, 732, 588 P .2d 458, 460 (1978). 
Melaleuca's Complaint asserts intentional interference with a prospective economic 
advantage and/or tortious interference with a contract. Both torts require a plaintiff to establish 
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damages. See Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 893, 242 P.3d 1069, 1081 
(Idaho 2010), reh'g denied Nov. 26, 2010) ("To establish a claim for intentional interference 
with a prospective economic advantage, [plaintiff] must show: ( 1) the existence of a valid 
economic expectancy, (2) knowledge of the expectancy on the part of the interferer, (3) 
intentional interference inducing termination of the expectancy, (4) the interference was 
wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself, and ( 5) resulting damage to 
the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted."); and Id. at 1083, quoting Bybee v. Isaac, 
145 Idaho 251, 259, 178 P.3d 616, 624 (Idaho 2008) ("Tortious interference with contract has 
four elements: '(1) the existence of a contract; (2) knowledge of the contract on the part of the 
defendant; (3) intentional interference causing a breach of contract; and (4) injury to the plaintiff 
resulting from the breach."') 
In the absence of evidence regarding the fact and amount of any damage alleged to have 
occurred in this case, Melaleuca's claim for breach of contract must fail. The district court's 
decision on the Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment was correct. The decision granting 
Summary Judgment and the Motion for Reconsideration should be reversed. 
II. The district court erred by failing to determine that the application of Policy 
20 constitutes an unlawful penalty or forfeiture in the absence of evidence that Melaleuca 
suffered any actual damages and the amount of any such damages. 
"Historically, courts of equity developed a rule, later adopted by courts of law, that 
contractual clauses prescribing penalties for a breach of contract would not be enforced because 
of the potential for over-reaching and unconscionable bargains .... Modem courts continue to 
refuse to enforce contract clauses that appear designed to deter a breach or to punish the 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 9 
breaching party rather than to compensate the injured party for damage occasioned by the 
breach." Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc. v. Meyer, 133 Idaho 110, 117, 982 P.2d 945, 952 
(Idaho Ct.App. 1999) (citations omitted). 
It is a long-established principle in Idaho that "[ e ]quity abhors forfeitures." Stringer v. 
Swanstrum, 66 Idaho 752, 760, 168 P.2d 826, 830 (Idaho 1946), and that '[e]quity will not grant 
specific performance of a forfeiture unless the failure to do so would lead to an unconscionable 
result." Sullivan v. Burcaw, 35 Idaho 755, 208 P. 841 (Idaho 1922), as quoted in Graves v. 
Cupic, 75 Idaho 451, 456, 272 P.2d 1020, 1023 (Idaho 1954). See also Dohrman v. Tomlinson, 
88 Idaho 313, 319, 399 P.2d 255, 259 (Idaho 1965) ("Forfeitures are abhorrent to the law and all 
intendments are against them."); and Magic Valley Truck Brokers, 133 Idaho at 117, 982 P.2d at 
952. 
In its original Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, the district court 
recognized that in the absence of proof related to Melaleuca's damages, the application of Policy 
20 constitutes such a penalty: 
Melaleuca states that the [$23,856.41] amount requested is reasonable because it 
exactly matches the damages Melaleuca suffered as a result of paying 
commissions to the Foellers. This argument is unconvincing based on the 
evidence currently before this court. Melaleuca seeks to retroactively take 
money paid to the Foellers for sales commissions; there is no argument or 
evidence that these commissions were not tied to profitable sales as a result of the 
Foellers' work as contractors for Meleleuca or that these are recognizable 
damages. Rather, it appears that, lacking other evidence, Policy 20(c) acts 
solely to "deter a breach or to punish the breaching party." 
Opinion, Decision, and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
entered December 1, 2010, Clerk's Record on Appeal, page 58. 
In its opinion on reconsideration, the district court determined that: 
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Without considering the argument now made by Melaleuca that commissions 
paid to marketing executives generally are not tied to any specific sales 
activity undertaken by them, the Court is now persuaded that Policy 20( c)(i) 
simply excuses Melaleuca from performing under a contract that has been 
breached by the other party. As cited by Melaleuca, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has clearly held that "[i]f a breach of contract is material, the other 
party's performance is excused." J.P. Stravens Planning Associates, Inc. v. 
City of Wallace, 129 Idaho 542, 545, 928 P.2d 46, 49 (Ct.App 1996) (citing 
Ervin Constr. Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 700, 874 P.2d 506, 511 
(1993)). "A substantial or material breach of contract is one which touches 
the fundamental purpose of the contract and defeats the object of the parties in 
entering into the contract." J.P Stravens, 129 Idaho at 545, 928 P.2d at 49 
(quoting Ervin Const. Co., 125 Idaho at 700, 874 P.2d at 511. 
Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, entered 
December 21, 2011, Clerk's Record on Appeal, page 593. 
The court improperly relied upon the contract defense of material breach rather than 
requiring proof of damages. This reasoning is incorrect for the same reasons described above. 
In light of its failure to provide any evidence of damage, this Court cannot determine at 
this juncture whether the forfeiture policies, at least as applied to Defendants, are unenforceable 
penalties. Melaleuca is obligated to show that the penalty it seeks to enforce bears a reasonable 
relation to its alleged injuries. Melaleuca must have provided evidence showing that there is no 
material factual dispute calling into question its assertion that its forfeiture policy is valid and 
enforceable. It has not done so. There is no evidence that the amount of commissions paid to 
Defendants after their alleged breaches of contract is a reasonable estimate of the damage 
Melaleuca alleges it has suffered. According to Ms. Foeller, Melaleuca received a substantial 
benefit as a result of her being a marketing executive, even during the time she allegedly violated 
Policy 20: 
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[t]he $1 .7 million [paid to me over the years] was directly related to commissions 
on product purchased by my organization. Aside from bonuses earned by growing 
the organization, all income earned was from commissions for product that my 
organization purchased. For example, for the month of September 2008, the last 
month I received compensation, my organization produced 67,089 points. This 
equates to at least $140,000 paid to Melaleuca for product by my organization. 
From these purchases, I received $167.40for "pool" money, $1,200 for a car 
allowance, and $6,312. 83 for commissions on my organization. 
Affidavit of Natalie Foeller, filed November 9, 2011, Clerk's Record on Appeal, page 
448. 
Thus, the sale of products that led to the payment of Defendants' commissions resulted in 
sales to Melaleuca, through which it apparently obtained a profit totaling $132,319.77 for the 
month of September 2008 ($140,000- $6,312.83 - $1,200- $167.40 $132,319.77). 
Granting summary judgment to Melaleuca solely on the basis of the amount of 
commissions paid was not appropriate. Further, since Melaleuca has failed to provide any 
evidence of its damages, the district court's decision to deny the Foellers' Motion for Summary 
J udf:,:rment was also inappropriate and should be reversed. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
The Foellers are entitled to recover their attorney fees and court costs incurred on appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Code sections 12-120(3 ). This matter arises out of a commercial transaction. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Foellers respectfully request that the district court's 
decision to grant Melaleuca's Motion for Reconsideration, to grant summary judgment in favor 
of Melaleuca, and to deny the Foeller's Motion for Summary Judgment be reversed by this 
Court. 
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DATED This 1.1_ day of December, 2012. 
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